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Ac·cident C~ompensation ,and Prev·ention.: a Step Back in Time 
Ian C.ampbell* 
This paper is concerned with the link between accident compensation and prevention and 
examines aspects where the Accident Rehabilitation and Compensation Insurance Act 1992 
(ARC/A) may affect the overall pr,eventive effort. Panicular attention is paid to work-~elated 
disease, stress, the exclusion of compensation .for work-relate,d mental disease and the effect of 
the new restrictions that ensue fro.m the new definition of ~~accident." The ,new provisions for 
,experience rating a~e examined as well as the possibility that the .legislation has opened the way 
for common law claims where the .liab.ility of AC~C has been curtailed. 
Changes wrought by the Accident Rehabilitation and Compensation Insurance Act 1'992 
(ARCIA), important though they are, cannot be considered without refelience to other recent 
legislation. Commencing with the Employment Contracts Act 1991, the Government began to 
introduce a package of refottns which has considerable implications for industrial relations and 
its allied aspects. The last of the triad was the Health and Safety in Employment Act 1992 
(HSEA). It is not possible to consider some aspects of these statutes ~entirely in isolation, and 
this paper ·will focus on the chang~es in accident compensation that have received less public 
attention than have other aspects and which, at the same time, are ~closely related to prevention. 
The most obvious connection between the AR~CIA and the HSEA is the emphasis that 
Government has laid on the incentive that is being introduced in the fo1n1 of experience rating. 
This incentive rests on the assumption that employers will move to eliminate or reduce injuries 
and disease that atuact compensation thus avoiding the possibility of having to pay a penalty or, 
on the other hand, increase any Iiebate that may be received under the scheme. What then are 
some of the key changes? 
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The origins of change 
These are to be found in the paradoxically named white paper., Accident ~Comp.ensation: 
A Fairer Sche.me, which clearly foreshadows the intention to reduce the cost of accident 
compensation in a number of ways. This has been accomplished by abolishing some benefits, 
transferring the burden of employees' non-work injuries from employers to employees themselves 
and other festrictive measures limiting entitlement to compensation. At the same time much has 
been made of a new experience rating system which is being introduced. 
The ARCIA sets out several new definitions, a few of which substantially change existing 
practice and compensation entitlements. Initially it is perhaps useful to recall that it has been 
well established that in the absence of a specific definition of a word or phrase in any Act or 
regulation., that word or phrase should be interpreted in its ordinary meaning as set out in JUlY 
standard dictionary and as Davison ~CJ reminded us in Wallbutton v ACC [1983] NZACR 629 at 
632: " ... one must look to the ordinary interpretation of that word to see what is encompassed 
within the meaning.'' Thus unless there is · a desire on the part of the legislators to resttict the 
meaning of a particular word in any way there is no need for a specific ·defmition in any statute. 
Another point to be considered is s5(j) of the Acts Interpretation Act 1924 which pfovides: 
Every Act ... shall be deemed remedial ... and shall receive such fair, large, and liberal 
construction and interpretation as will best ensure the attainment of the object of the Act ... 
As Lord Wright stated in Craig v Dover Navigation Co Ltd [1939] 4 AllER 243 at p.199: 
It has been established by various decisions of this House that the Workmen's Compensation 
Act is a ~emedial measure intended to give rights beyond what the ~common law gave, and that 
it is a practical measure expressed in non-technical language, to be construed according to the 
ordinary sense of mankind. 
~Clearly such a view equally applies to Workers' and A~ccident Compensation Acts. However the 
Government in introducing a definition of "accident" has rejec~ed the long standing interpretation 
of that word as applied to the succession of Workers' Compensation Acts and the Accident 
Compensation Acts of 1972 and 1982. As the White Paper explained: 
In the present legislation there is no definition of either personal injury or accident As a result, 
the boundaries of the scheme have been extended ov.er the years to cover situations which most 
people would have difficulty in feconciling with the common view of what an accident is. This, 
in tum, has led to cost increases. (Birch, 1991: 31) 
There is no mention of the fact that most people would have difficulty with the interpretation of 
.. accident." An appreciation of what Government had in mind may possibly be gained from an 
examination of cases reponed in recent Law Reports which would probably be excluded by the 
changes brought in by the ARCIA. For example subparagraph (a) of the definition of "accident" 
in s3 of the Act, makes it clear that the intention was to exclude any event or series of events 
that do not involve ''the application of a force or resistance external to the human body," a 
provision that has caused considerable concern. Funhet 1nore, at this stage, there is considerable 
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uncertainty as to its ultimate effect, though ACC has issued guidelines in newslett~ers. 
One can well ask by what ~criteria the ~Government came to the conclusion that such 
claims should not be regarded as arising from personal injury by accident. Our law is a dynamic 
body of knowledge and practice and does not remain static. From time to time the Couns have 
developed new interpretations or ~extensions of old ones, as the Courts recognise changing 
community values and situations. Indeed it could be said that such moves are often 'tOO tardy. 
The incredible decision of Lord Arbinger CB in Priestly v Fowler [ 1837] 3 M & W 1 which ,gave 
rise to the doctrine of common employment, is a case in point. Though subsequent decisions put 
a dent in that principle the doctrine was not finally put to rest until the passing of the Law 
Refottn A~ct 1936. In commenting on the rationale of Lord Arbinger, Lord Wright said many 
years later in Radcliffe v Ribble Motor S~ervices Ltd [ 1939] 1 All ER 637 at 651: ''[ t]hese 
instances seem to show personal apprehension rather than any principle ... 
Traditionally administrators pre~er issues to be clear-cut but unless there is some degree 
of discretion allowed to the ultimate authority then some injustices will prevail. As Gault J 
commented in ACC v E [1992] 2 NZLR 426 at 431: 
... to intea pret the expression narrowly would be to exclude injwies in respect of which 
compensation has been paid as a matter of course in the past, such as back injuries sustained 
in the course of normal lifting work or muscle injuries sustained in sport. ~Cover for such 
injuries has been commonplace under the workers compensation Acts and has been common-
place under the Accident Compensation Act at least since the decision of Davison CJ in 
Wallbuuon v ACC [1983] NZACR 629 which followed the House of Lords in Jones v Secretary 
of State for Social Services. 
Nevertheless, over time there hav~e been frequent references to the fact that in the 
Accident Compensation Act and its predecessors, the Work~ers' Compensation A~cts, there has 
been no defmition of "accident. .. The British Workmen's Compensation Act 1897 frrst used the 
words "personal injury by accident." New Zealand follow~e-d in the Workers ' Compensation for 
Accidents Act 1900. ,As ,may be expected, in those ~early days doubts arose as to how those 
wofds should be interpre~ed. A group of three cases was reported together in [1900] 1 QB 481. 
Hens,ey v Whit~e, Lloyd v Sugg & ~Co and ~alker v Lilleshall Coal ~Co Ltd. The frrst case 
concerned a worker who collapsed and died shortly after endeavouring to turn a stubborn wheel. 
The second case involved a worker suffering from gout of the hand whose hand was struck by 
a fellow worker 'When holding the object being hammered, while the thini case concerned a 
work~er who was suffering from a blistered hand but ·whose foreman insisted on his carrying on 
to finish a job. His hand was poisoned through contact with oil and red lead. Only Lloyd was 
awarded compensation as the judge said: "[a]nyone might have a weak hand. Was it to be said 
that in such a case as this only those with cast iron hands came within the Act." 
While it is difficult to follow the reasoning of the appeal judges in the frrst ,and third 
cases, the matter was soon put beyond dispute by a decision of 'the House of Lords -- Fenton v 
Thorley & Co Ltd [1903] AC 443. In that case a worker suffered a rupture. As Lord 
Macnaughton explained at p.448: 
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Now the expression "injury by accident" seems to me to be a compound expression. The words 
"by accident" are introduced parenthetically as it were to qualify lhe word "injury," confming 
it to a certain class of injuries, and excluding other classes, as, for instance, injuries by disease 
or injuries self-inflicted by design .... I come, therefore, to the conclusion that the expliession 
"accident" is used in the popular and ordinary sense of the word as denoting an unlooked-for 
mishap or an untoward event which is not expected or designed. 
Deciding the bo·undaries of the scheme 
Initially it is the function of ACC to deteitnine entitlement to compensation, with these 
decisions being subject to appeal. However no administrative body is infallible and an example 
of how a deterrnination may be made in a narrow way is well illustrated in decisions concerning 
compensation for work-Jielated disease, admittedly not an easy topic. In Lynch v 
Attorney-General [1959] NZLR 445, a case under the Workers' Compensation Act 1956, the 
question was whether the phrase "due to the nature of any employment" should be interpreted 
as meaning due to the nature of that industry in general or the particular worker's employment. 
Archer J held that it was unnecessary to prove that the de1n1atitis the plaintiff had developed was 
a recognised and inherent risk of the operation of mining, but rather of the plaintiff's own 
employment. 
In its earlier deliberations ACC has taken the rather narrow view, such as one case, 
Decision No 50 (1977) 1 NZAR 295, where compensation was denied to a cleaner who 
contracted dettnatitis and sought to establish that it was caused by the cleansing materials that 
she was using. It would seem that the Appeal Authority also took the narrow approach holding 
that no special risk of det n1atitis had been proved as the " ... ordinary duties of a ~cleaner did not 
expose her to a special risk of det tnatitis," even though the problems of detergents are well 
known. 
However in a more recent decision of the Accident Compensation Appeal Authority, Re 
Fyfe: Decision No 29187 (1987) 6 NZAR 317, the following summary appears in the headnote: 
Prior to 1982 the Corporation's policy was based on interpreting the corresponding provision 
of the 1975 (sic) Act so as to require a claimant to show that the general class of work in which 
the claimant was engaged had by its nature a .~ecognised tendency to cause the disease 
complained of. Thereafter, however, the test was widened by allowing compensation also when 
there was a causal connection between the particular work and 'the disease an approach 
based on Lynch v Auorney-General [1959] NZLR 455 and Connair Pty Ltd v Fredericksen 
(1979) 53 AlJR 505. 
Interestingly, Blair J, the frrst Accident Compensation Appeal Authority, in commenting 
on Lynch's case, stated "[i]t may be considered, however, that he expressed the law too widely." 
(Blair, 1983: 88) The reality is, however, that whether or not the plaintiffs disease was a 
recognised hazard of the occupation in general or just due to the particular employment, the 
disease is equally work-related. The decision taken by ACC to use the narrow interpretation 
throws into question the contention expressed in the White Paper concerning the alleged 
extension of the boundaries of the scheme and whether ACC has ~exefCised "such fair, large, and 
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liberal construction and interpretation as 'Will best ensure the attainment of the object of the Act" 
in accordance with the Acts Interpretation Act 1924. Presumably Government has, to a 
considerable extent, relied on advice received from ACC, and ACC in its turn cannot but be 
influenced by comments from Government circles and elsewhere on the alleged excessive cost 
of Accident Compensation. 
The words of Lord Diplock in Jones v The Secretary of Social Services [1972] AC 944 
concerning the British Social Security legislation at p.1005 are of more than passing interest: 
To find out the meaning of panicular provisions in social legislation of this character calls, in 
the flfSt instance, for a purposive approach 10 the Act as a whole 10 ascenain the social ends it 
was intended to achieve and the practical means by which it was expected to achieve them. 
Meticulous linguistic analysis of words and phrases used in different context in particular 
sections of the Act should be subordinate to this purposive approach. 
In ACC v Mitchell [1992] 2 NZI..,R 436 at 438, Richardson J made a pertinent comment: 
... a generous unniggardly interpretation of personal injury accident is in keeping with the policy 
underlying the Accident Compensation Act of providing ~comprehensive cover for all those 
suffering personal injury by ,accident in New Zealand wherever, whenever and however 
occurring. And to do so in place of common law remedies. Certainly if the expression is fairly 
,capable of covering all accidental injuries whether or not precipitated by an external triggering 
incident, that interpretation would better feflect the philosophy underlying this major social 
legislation. 
One ~could w,ell query whether with the passing of ARCIA the original philosophy has been 
abandoned, along with the liberal interpretations made by a succession of judges over the years. 
It is possible that this case and E' s case quoted earlier were ones that the Government considered 
went beyond the popular concept of injury by accident But one cannot overlook the cogent 
reasons adopted by the courts in these decisions. It is strongly suggested that they deserve more 
consideration than the views of administrators. 
The new definition of .. accident" has introduced a great deal of uncertainty which ACC 
has attempted to allay with the issue of extensive newsletters. It is submitted that the new lines 
which now have to be drawn can ~esult in distinctions equally as confusing as those ~commented 
on in the 'White Paper quoted above. 
Disease or injury 
A number of cases have been concerned with injuries that were contracted over time. In 
Fife Coal Co Ltd v Young [1940] A~C 479, a worker suffered some loss of power of doiSiflexion 
of the right foot. Compensation was awarded as he was able to point to a particular change on 
a particular day. Injuries that gradually occurred were frequently ruled out as they were not then 
covered by the disease provisions of the Act Differentiating disease from injury would seem 
to be only significant in compensation issues, as occupational health and safety policy, however 
implemented, seeks to ~eliminat~e or reduce both disease and injury. Though the importance of 
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this distinction lies largely in matters of compensation, preventive issues may also be affected. 
With good reason, some writers have maintained that the distinction drawn between 
"injury" and "disease", though superficially a logical one, is in many ·respects an artificial one. 
Brooks in a detailed examination of the development of judicial interpretation of the concepts of 
injury and disease in Australia comments: "the resultant obscurity and inaccessibility of these 
conoepts to non-lawyers will be painfully apparent.u (Brooks., 1987: 40) Here, as Stapleton 
maintains, the legal and medical professions seem to differ, noting that: " ... the demarcation lines 
between these classes we artificial from a medical point of view but for various reasons they 
provide workable classifications for legal analysis". (Stapleton, 1986: 40) 
Later Stapleton, af~er outlining compensation problems with conditions that gradually 
develop over a period, and the tendency to exclude pathogenic attacks as being due to a 
"process," comments: "[t]he conceptual irrationality of the distinction is now generally accept~. iff 
(p.51) She also mentions that "[m]edical usage itself makes no shatp distinction between inJury 
by accident and disease." (p.50) Ferguson comments: "Acute chemical and physical burns, for 
example, can be seen as injuries whereas acute and sub-acute internal effects from radiations or 
inhalation may not." (p.21) H~e then asks: "is hepatitis B, contracted in a laboratory from 
accidental needle prick, disease or injury?" (p.21) 
Thefe remains considerable room for dispute, which may become crucial when the law 
attempts to define ternts more precisely, as is suggested in the recent White Paper on Accident 
~Compensation. As Boden .et al. explain: 
Scientific evidence is often essential in the determination of legal causation, but it is not a 
substitute for it Both take their origins from common experiences, and both depart from these 
origins in ways connected with the context in which they are used. In science that context is 
dominated by objectivity and generality, in law, by the notion of a responsible subject and a 
singularity and uniqueness of occurrence .... since law and science have different objectives, 
some differences in the detenn ination of legal and scientific cause should come as no surprise . 
(Boden et al., 1988: 1 028) 
It remains just to note these views which really do not affect the extent of the issues being 
reviewed. 
Though so far New .Zealand has not adopted a schedule of occupational diseases, it was 
considefed that the provisions of s28 of the Accident Compensation Act 1982 were sufficiently 
·wide-ranging to cover all those diseases in the World Health Organisation (WHO) schedule, 
which are almost exclusively occupational diseases rather than work-related ones. Thus when 
a worker whose work involves exposure to lead contracts lead poisoning there should be no doubt 
that the disease is "due to the nature of any employment'' in the tettns of s28 of the Accident 
~Compensation Act 1982. In an official publication the following appears.: 
While the Accident Compensation Corporation believes that the present legislation gives wider 
cover than could be given under an exclusive schedule it is at present engaged in preparing a 
schedule of occupational diseases. The schedule will be adopted for administrative purposes, 
and will not exclude cover for diseases which ar·e not listed but which qualify in terms of 
general statutory provision. (Department of Labour, 1988: 45) 
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However the schedule has not been fonnalised. A recent International Labour Organisation (ILO) 
report again considered New Zealand, commenting that the lack of a schedule "leaves the burden 
of proof ... to the worker (and) is not in accordance with the Convention ... ", there being no 
automatic presumption. It continues: 
The Committee 'therefore once again urges the Government to re-examine this question and to 
take the necessary measures ~to bring the national legislation in full conformity with the 
convention by supplementing the general definition of occupational diseases contained in the 
Accident Compensation Act by a non-exhaustive list of occupational diseases and corresponding 
trades, unless it chooses to ratify Convention 121, which provides fcw, inter alia, the system of 
"full coverage" in its Article 8(b) and the ratification of which would ipso jure involve the 
denunciation of Convention 42. (IL0.1992: 167) 
However the schedule approach cannot solve the problem of the work-related diseases, for whil~e 
a schedule could link asbestosis with exposure to asbestos dust, it could not do so with a 
carcinoma of the lung. The fotrner is an occupational disease, while the latter is regarded as a 
work-related disease, one which can also arise from a cause unrelated to work. (World Health 
~Organisation, 1985: 9) 
It is well known than many injuries come within the heading of "'strains and sprains". 
While many of these would be the result of a fesistance, such as lifting or meeting resistance 
from a stubborn object that the injured person is attempting to shift, some would not One may 
well ask why those types of injuries are being singled out for ,elimination from the scheme. It 
is difficult to accept that such injuries are ones that the average person would have problems in 
recognising as a genuine accidental injury. Two questions would seem to arise. What are the 
types of ,claims that Government sought to exclude from the operation of the Act? In what way 
are they so different from other injuries that this course of action was justified? Reference to the 
White Paper would suggest that the main objective was to cut ~costs. 
Stress 
Continuing its concern with costs, the White Paper then turns to the problem of stress 
claims, stating: 
Stress claims are a major cause of escalating ,costs in those overseas workers' compensation 
schemes that compensate for stress. The present scheme does not include stress cover and the 
Working Party considered that this should not change. Grounds for this conclusion were not 
only lhe high costs, but also that stress is the result of a number of interrelated factors. 
The Working Party also recommended that physical injury should be present before mental 
injury is covered. Although this may give an appearance of arbittariness, lhis requirement ·was 
seen as necessary in order 'to avoid stress claims entering "through the back door."' The 
Government supports this view. (Birch, 1991: 32) 
Thus to avoid the expense of paying str~ess-related claims all claims for mental disease ar~e 
excluded unless the mental condition is consequent on physical injury. 
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The state.ment that stress was not then covered by Accident ~Compensation is incotiect, 
though admittedly with such claims, it would not be easy to establish the link between the stress 
and the work. However it would seem that the overstatement in the White Paper was realised, 
~or in the explanatory note to the Bill, after referring to the exclusion of stress cover, it 
comments: "[t]his gives statutory w~eight to the cu11ient policy." 'This infers that ACC's non-
liecognition of stress claims was without statutory direction. Interestingly, when one claimant 
sought compensation on the grounds of work-related stress, ACC defended the claim not on the 
basis that stress was not covered by the Act, but on the absence of proof that the condition was 
work-related. Re Fyfe: Decision No 29187 (1987) 6 NZAR 317. 
Then there is the drastic move to exclude mental injury unless it results from physical 
injury. As Lord Macmillan said in .Bourhill v Young [1943] AC 92 at p.103: 
The crude view that the law should take ~cognizance only of physical injury resulting from actual 
impact has been discarded, and it is now well recognised that. an action will lie for injury by 
shock sustained through the medium of 'the eye or the ear without direct ~contact. The distinction 
between mental shock and bodily injury was never a scientific one, for mental shock is 
presumably in all ~cases the result of or at least accompanied by, some physical disturbance in 
the sufferer's system . . And a mental shock may have consequences more serious than those 
resulting from physical impact But in the case of mental shock there are elements of greater 
subtlety than in the case of an ordinary physical injury and those elements .may give rise to 
debate as to the pfecise scope of legal liability . 
The ILO has published a number of reports on stress, such as Stress in Industry: causes, effects 
and prevention by L Levi, ~OHS Series No 51 (1984). The issue of stress has been aired in the 
report of a committee considering the problems of firemen involved in the ICI chemical 
warehouse frre. One of the committee's conclusions was as follows: 
We consider that the continuing symptoms displayed by frrefighters are the result of long-tenn 
and understandable stress caused by their involvement in the f1re. ~Our reasons are: 
·• a toxicological explanation is wholly inconsistent. with what is known of toxicological 
effect 
• 
• 
the skin symptoms, which are non-specific, could be a result of skin sensitization at the 
ftrc, but could also be explained by stress and emotional upset 
the neuropsychological test results may not indicate a statistically significant group 
response and may themselves measure dysfunction based on stress rather than 
neurotoxicity 
the G HQ [General Health Questionnaire] results and the uncenainty, anxiety and 
existence of substantial stressors as a result of the social history of the fue, 3fe all 
strong pointers to an ,emotional basis for the symptoms rather than a toxicological one. 
(ICI Fire Repon, 1'990: 105) 
Thus the exclusion of mental disease is a far reaching one. 
It is perhaps well to recall that s2 of the Law Refotin Act 1944 was enacted because of 
an apparent conflict between a decision of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council and a 
later decision of the House of Lords. (NZPD 267, 1944: 423) The section 2 provides: 
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In any action for injury to the person whether founded in ~contract or in tort or otherwise, a party 
shall not be deterred from recovering damages merely because the injwy complained of arose 
wholly or in pan from mental or nervous shock. 
• 
This is yet another indication of the seriousness of the moves that have been made with the new 
statute. 
The other exclusions specifically made in the new Act are those contained in s7(2): 
personal injury attributabl~e to either air-conditioning systems or passiv~e smoking. These 
exclusions are arbitrary and an adequate explanation is elusive,. Shonly after the Act was passed, 
several deaths were reponed from Sydney as a 'liesult of Legionnaires' Disease. These cases we11e 
believed to be due to defective air-conditioning in a shopping mall. Then follow~ed a report, also 
from Sydney, of a successful damages claim in which passive smoking was implicated. 
Experienc~e rating 
The major link between the ARCIA and prevention lies in s 104 which provides for 
experience rnting. From the 'White Paper it ~could be assumed that Government had accepted that 
experience rating is regarded as a matter of equity, rather than as an incentive to employers to 
obey the law. Nevertheless in introducing the Health and Safety in Employment Bill, the 
Minister stated that "the accident compensation refotin of experience rating .... ·will provide a 
carrot and stick approach to health and satety in employment." (NZPD 521 (1991 p.6396) 
R~esearch overseas clearly suggests otherwise. (Campbell, 1989: 3-8) 
However, accepting the Government's expectation that their moy,e will provide an 
incentive for employers to be more activ~e with measures, there is a negative side to the changes. 
Clearly thelie is now no incentive for employers to eliminate conditions in their workplaces that 
are likely to engender stress or ~cause mental illness; nor are they encouraged to maintain 
air-conditioning systems or reduc~e passive smoking. 
Two ~experienoe rating schemes have been adopted. The first appli~es to all ~e-mployers that 
pay ACC less than $10,000 in a year. Employers who aJie claim-free within the year will get a 
15% no-claims discount. For many employers, being claim-free will be of no significance, for 
the reality is 'that with the size and nature of their undenaki:ng a ~claim will be a very rar~e event. 
However., in many of those cases the amount of any rebate ·will be very small. On the other 
hand, with the ~employers approaching the $10,000 premium, there will be no balancing penalty 
with which to pay the rebates, and this will have to be borne in the base rnte. For those 
employers paying $10,000 or more, they will either receive a rebate of up to 50o/o or pay a. 
penalty of up to 100%. Simply put, if the pfemiums ~exceed the claims then a rebate will be paid, 
and if the claims exceed the premiums than a penalty will be imposed. The r~esultant figur~e 
(rebate or penalty) will be multiplied by an Employer S~e Factor. This factor is det~ermined by 
a table which starts at 0.15 (where the employer's premium is from $10,000 to $1 0,220) to 0.6 
(where the employer's premium is $1,000,000 or over). 
The Accident Compensation (Accident Experience) Regulations 1992 are gazetted 
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seem to have been overlooked in the drafting of those regulations. Subsection (1) requires tluee 
factors to be tak~en into account: 
(a) the ~experience of the employer; and 
(b) the frequency of the accidents; and 
(c) the financial cost to A~CC of those accidents. 
Nowhere in the 1992 regulations is any fef:elienc~e made to the frequency rate. Subsection (2) of 
the 1982 Act requires the experience of the employer to be ~compared .. with the g~eneral accident 
~experience of employers ... in the same class." It is impossible for ACC to compare the 
~experience of an employer with the general experience of employers in the same class. The 
Accident Compe.nsation Employers and Self-employed Persons Levies Order 1991 sets out 
premiums under 24 Class Numbers. However since ACC abandoned its industry-based 
classifications and adopted a system based on the Standard Industrial Classifications, then by po 
stretch of the imagination ~could it be said that a comparison made within those classes is 
comparing like with like in accordanoe with the clear intention of s40. Much more could be 
written on this aspect of the new legislation. For example, there does not appear to hav~e been 
any serious ~consideration given to the suggestion of the Law Commission that there be "a power 
to impose penalties by reference to observed conditions." (Law Commission, 1988: 39) 'The 
.. Workwell Program" recently introduced in Ontario also deserves study. It is based on a detailed 
audit similar to the International Safety Rating System. 
Is the way now open for common law claims? 
Finally, there is the extent to which the new Act has reopened the opportunity for an 
injured person now denied compensation to pursue a claim at common law. Section 14 refers 
to "personal injury by accident" with respect to cover under the 1972 and 1982 Acts but 
"personal injury" with respect to the 1992 Act ~On the face of it, it would seem clear that a 
person denied cover by reason of the ex~clusions introduced by the 1992 Act and who could prove 
that their injury was caused through the negligenc~e of another pany will have the right to sue for 
damages. Such savings as have been introduced by the new exceptions could well be ~exceeded 
by the cost of future common law claims. However, though the answer seems clear that the way 
has been opened for such actions, this and some other issues must await a determination in the 
Courts . 
Conclusio·ns 
What then has been accomplished by the new ARCI Act'? Clearly, rather than simplifying 
the legislation, many complications have been introduced. Their outcomes must ultimately await 
legal action. C~ertainly, compensation entitlements have been reduced, in many cases in a 
somewhat arbitrary manner. The compensation effects must ~equally affect future p!ievention 
strategies. When the original 1972 Act was under consideration, not a few union officials and 
others were concerned that, having given up their common law rights, it would only be a matter 
of time before further ground would be lost. Clearly, their concern was justified and they may 
now well be considering what will be the next ground to be lost. 
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